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To the Editor 
 
Eyal Shahar’s essay review [1] of James Penston’s 
remarkable book [2] seems more inspired playful academic 
provocation than review or essay, expressing dramatic 
views of impossible validity. The account given of modern 
biostatistical causation reveals the slide from science into 
the intellectual confusion and non-science RCTs have 
created:  
 
“…. the purpose of medical research is to estimate 
the magnitude of the effect of a causal contrast, for 
example the probability ratio of a binary outcome 
…”  
 
But Shahar’s world is simultaneously not probabilistic, 
but of absolute uncertainty: “We should have no 
confidence in any type of evidence ….. We should have no 
confidence at all”. Shahar’s "Causal contrast" is 
attractive.  It seems to make sense, but bypasses in two 
words the means of establishing causation by the scientific 
method. This phrase assumes a numeric statistically 
significant “contrast” is causal rather than a potential 
correlation requiring further investigation.   
The concept of “causal contrast” is a slippery slope 
from sense into biostatistical non-science.  This can be 
illustrated with an hypothetical RCT where 100% of 
interventions exhibit a posited treatment effect and 0% of 
placebo controls.  Internal validity is seemingly quite 
reasonably assumed satisfied (common-sense dictating the 
likelihood of an awesome magnificent fraud, bias or plain 
error of the magnitude required is infinitesimal).  Scientific 
method appears satisfied.  The RCT demonstrates: (1) 
strict regularity of outcome in the presence of posited 
cause; (2) the absence of outcome in its absence and (3) an 
intervention (experiment) showing the direction of 
causation is from posited cause to posited effect. 
Now travel further down the slope from science.  
Assume 50% of interventions and 0% of controls are 
positive.  We compromise scientific method, but justify 
this by assuming a large subgroup which we say surely 
must on these figures be exhibiting the posited treatment 
effect. But what of 10% of interventions and 9% of 
placebo controls exhibiting the posited treatment effect?  
Our biostatistician says the 1% “causal contrast” is 
statistically significant.  But we have: (1) minimal 
evidence of regularity; (2) the posited outcome irrespective 
of presence of posited cause and (3) our intervention is at 
the highest equivocal in demonstrating any form of 
causation. This is not science.  It is, however, where 
biostatistics has unthinkingly taken us, as Penston has 
shown comprehensively [2]. 
We, the audience of published medical research, are 
now for the 10% / 9% example well down the slope from 
science.  
An unattractive hypothesis results requiring numerous 
assumptions similar to these:- 
 
"There is a 'contrast' which is ‘causal’, albeit the 
method employed is not scientific. An effect of the 
intervention has been observed in a very small 
subgroup. This subgroup is susceptible to treatment. 
The similar number of placebo controls exhibiting 
the outcome sought is irrelevant, because the 1% 
difference between intervention and controls is 
statistically significant. The statistical analysis is 
valid and reliable. The RCT’s internal validity is 
sufficiently satisfied. No funding or bias or fraud has 
affected the results or their analysis.” 
 
As Penston notes:  
 
“Confirming and refuting the results of research is 
crucial to science …. But … there’s no way of testing 
the results of any particular large-scale RCT or 
epidemiological study.  Each study … is left hanging 
in the air, unsupported.”   
 
It gets worse.  To identify a rare serious adverse 
reaction of a frequency of 1:10,000 can require a trial of 
200,000 or larger split between controls and interventions.  
This is not done. But for every 100 who prospectively 
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benefit from the intervention, 9,900 also receive it.  And 
for every 100 benefiting one person (who likely gains no 
benefit) will suffer a serious unidentified adverse reaction.  
This is also without taking account of more common 
adverse reactions whether serious or otherwise. 
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